My Facts are Better Than Yours: Decision-Making and Voting
My father used to say that he could never argue with his mother because, “Mom had her opinions and she wouldn’t let the facts get in the way.” This article by Robert Burton on Salon.com sheds some fascinating light on the psychology of decision-making and voting. In “My Candidate, Myself,” Burton writes:
In the current presidential election, a major percentage of voters are already committed to “their candidate”; new arguments and evidence fall on deaf ears. And yet, if we, as a country, truly want change, we must be open-minded, flexible and willing to revise our opinions when new evidence warrants it. Most important, we must be able to recognize and acknowledge when we are wrong.
Unfortunately, cognitive science offers some fairly sobering observations about our ability to judge ourselves and others….
Closely allied with this unshakable self-confidence in one’s decisions is a second separate aspect of meta-cognition, the feeling of being right….
The evidence is substantial that these feelings do not correlate with the accuracy or quality of the thought….
Feelings of absolute certainty and utter conviction are not rational deliberate conclusions; they are involuntary mental sensations generated by the brain. Like other powerful mental states such as love, anger and fear, they are extraordinarily difficult to dislodge through rational arguments. Just as it’s nearly impossible to reason with someone who’s enraged and combative, refuting or diminishing one’s sense of certainty is extraordinarily difficult. Certainty is neither created by nor dispelled by reason.
To a certain extent, we all engage in individual-groupthink, to coin a new phrase. After we make our conclusions, we discount contrary evidence while overvaluing evidence that affirms our assumptions. In my opinion, last Friday’s presidential debate seemed fairly even in that neither John McCain nor Barack Obama shot himself in the foot. Similarly, neither candidate performed head and shoulders above the other. But in seeing the polls afterward, people generally thought their candidate won the debate. Now, I am leaning a certain direction and have been for months. I will say that I found myself excusing certain errors or disagreements I have with him, while I railed against his opponent when he said something I didn’t like. My mind was made up, which to a large extent is fine, so long as I remain open to new information.
So what does Burton want from a president?
I want a president aware of how his mind works, as well as what he suspects are his inborn biases and intellectual limitations. Ironically, the acknowledgment of intellectual limitations may be the best evidence for superior decision-making skills. Contrary to George Bush’s belief, we do not want certainty in the White House. We want flexibility and an acknowledgment that certainty is often a sign of ignorance.
Unfortunately, sound bites, TV interviews and presidential debates often fail to reveal the candidates’ real thought processes—how each would approach a new or complex problem for which he or she doesn’t already have a pat answer.
Burton’s article is certainly helpful in forcing us to look at our assumptions and decisions and reminding us that it takes hard work to remain open to new information and evidence. He puts a bit too much stock in cold, objective reasoning and empirical evidence as the most basic and most commonly held means of knowing whether something is true or not—I think he tends to discount spiritual phenomena. Those of the more Republican persuasion may not like the tack Burton takes in the last quarter of the piece. But Burton’s article should make us aware of our biases as we enter the home stretch of this election cycle (finally) and as we listen to our candidates and their opponents. Abraham Lincoln described our instincts well when he said, “People who like this sort of thing will find this the sort of thing they like.”


Burton’s article is certainly interesting. What is incredibly ironic is the overall lack of self-reflexivity in making “objective” claims that rely on what appears to be a very deterministic conception of what thinking is.
“Most cognitive scientists now believe that the majority of our thoughts originate in the areas of the brain inaccessible to conscious introspection. These beginnings of thoughts arrive in consciousness already colored with inherent bias. No two people see the world alike. Each of our perceptions is filtered through our genetic predispositions, inherent biologic differences and idiosyncratic life experiences. Your red is not my red. These differences extend to the very building blocks of thoughts; each of us will look at any given question from his own predispositions. Thinking may be as idiosyncratic as fingerprints.”
If any of this is true, then what I wonder is whether this paragraph also originated in an area of the brain inaccessible to the cognitive scientists’ conscious introspection, which then arrived in their own consciousness already colored with inherent bias, filtered through their own biological predispositions, etc. Why should I trust the thinking of one who thinks that thinking may be as idiosyncratic as fingerprints? If my thinking is unique to me, then on what basis can Burton say that what any person thinks about politics is shaped by a preconceived bias? Any argument derived from determinism of this sort is bound (!) to be a self-refuting.
That being said, I think there is some merit to the conclusion that once a decision is made, recalcitrant facts are shuffled to one side. Taking a modest Kuhnian approach, we do operate within certain paradigms, and these can color our evaluation of what follows. This is something I have seen especially in the reaction to Sarah Palin. There are certainly people on the left who made up their minds that they didn’t like her on August 29th, and her shortcomings over the past month reaffirmed their view. And there are also people on the right who have accepted her without scrutiny, not recognizing that she has a lot to get up to speed on in a very short amount of time. That everyone is susceptible to “individual groupthink” is, I think, a much-needed observation. The trick, though, in making that observation is avoiding Burton’s mistake, which is being a postmodernist when describing others (that’s your perspective) while being a modernist when describing himself (these are objective facts).
Comment by Timbo — October 1, 2008 @ 11:37 pm
Timbo, I’ve been trying to figure out how to respond to your comment. As a psychology major at a research university, I’m more attuned with the cognitive arguments Burton makes than with the philosophical and epistemological discussion you bring up. We can see in this discussion how psychology and philosophy are branches off the same tree and how they differ from each other now.
I have sympathy both to Burton’s argument and yours. As a professor of mine once rhetorically asked regarding this subject, “Why is it that I can go to a deli and order a pastrami sandwich and the butcher behind the counter doesn’t give me roast beef?” While I can’t be certain that the red I see looks the same as the red you see, we still can say to one another, “That is red.”
I think you hit the nail on the head with this statement: “The trick, though, in making that observation is avoiding Burton’s mistake, which is being a postmodernist when describing others (that’s your perspective) while being a modernist when describing himself (these are objective facts).”
Comment by Tyler Watson — October 3, 2008 @ 11:57 am
Por Ejemplo:
Language Game 1, everything from Journalism to Artistic Endeavor may only exhibit Truth if its constituent parts in research do not distort the contexts from which they originate.
Language Game 2, in order to shatter the lies of existing power, new statements and propositions must be constructed by taking existing lies (Platonic Noble Lies) out of context to reveal the truth these attempt to mask (This strategy = Nietzschean Creative Lies).
Who will settle the dispute between the two language games? The positive assertion for either reveals how one feels about power.
Thus, Tyler, remembering Wittgenstein’s writings on language games makes me unsure that Timbo’s closing statement hits the nail on the head. The closing statement is a sort of language game. Games in the sense that basketball is a game. Yet Lakers fans and Celtics fans will never switch sides as to who the greatest is, regardless of the arguments. Where I feel Burton comes in is as follows: There is a difference between making a ‘meta-observation’ that attempts to step back and view the landscape of ideas (e.g., truth propositions will never be agreed upon - this is attributable to psychological forces at play in the person), and the empirical statements themselves (i.e., “Cutting taxes for the elite (allegedly) bolsters the economy.” Or even ones that are speculative but derive from observation: “Palin is an ignoramus because…” versus “No she is not, or it is ok that she needs to catch up, because…”
What Timbo describes is the meta-level of discourse that says ‘there is truth’, but many millenia have gone by (far before Modernism and all the way back to the Platonic assertion that objective truth is what drives our will to knowledge) with no such luck in bringing agreement as to what that truth is. Unfortunately, resolving the experiment in how human life might best be lived always leaves the study and enters the battlefield, as Russell claimed. Again, the best description of Postmodern thought was Lyotard’s: an incredulity that metanarratives will ever be resolved through intellectual pursuit. 30 years and counting since he said it, and we’re no closer to resolution…
Making the assertion that ‘there is truth’ is fine, or that ‘there is red’ is fine, but of what value is it if argument does not bring all language games into submission to that truth?
Comment by Nathaniel James Thompson — October 3, 2008 @ 2:34 pm